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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Sonja M. King and 
Michael King, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
No. 19968 
vs. 
PETITION FOR 
Joe Barron, REHEARING 
Defendant and Appellee 
COMES NOW, Joe Barron, Defendant and Appellee, by and through his 
attorney undersigned, and, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, hereby petitions this Court for 
rehearing of the decision filed November 4, 1988. 
This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities attached hereto and incorporated herewith. 
Counsel undersigned certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
Dated this 3LUr day of November 1988. 
(A A ^ 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Nature of Petition for Rehearing 
Appellee, Joe Barron, requests a rehearing of the Court's 
decision that Appellant, on redirect examination, should be able 
to testify that she did not receive an award in the King v. 
Fereday matter. The specific points which the Court should 
reconsider are set forth below. 
1. THE COURT'S OPINION ERRONEOUSLY STATES THAT BARRON'S POSITION 
IS THAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT RESOLUTION 
WAS MADE OF HER CLAIM AGAINST FEREDAY. 
The opinion states: 
"Barron contends that her testimony as to claims she 
made against Fereday was admissible as a prior 
inconsistent statement or as an admission against 
interest. Barron would stop the inquiry there and 
not allow Mrs. King to explain on redirect examination 
what resolution was made of her claims against Fereday." 
Opinion Pages 5-6 (hereinafter, "Op. Pg. ") 
In point of fact, the question asked by Plaintiff's counsel 
did not deal with a resolution of the claims made against both 
Mr. Fereday and Mr. Barron. Rather, the question asked was 
directed towards what "award" was made in the Fereday trial for 
the 1982 accident. In fact, the Plaintiff received no award 
because the jury in the Fereday trial found that the accident was 
caused by Mrs. King. The Fereday jury made no determination 
regarding whether there were damages appropriately related to the 
Fereday accident. 
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2. MRS. KING WAS GIVEN FULL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THE 
RESOLUTION OF HER CLAIMS MADE IN THE FEREDAY MATTER. 
The opinion states: 
"Once the subject of previous claims had been 
interjected into the case by defendant to discredit 
Mrs. King, we believe that she was entitled to make 
a full disclosure on that subject to rehabilitate 
herself and to dispel any inference that a verdict 
for her would result in double recovery*" Op.pg 8-9. 
Mrs. King was given, and took advantage of, her opportunity of 
explaining the reason she made the same claims in both lawsuits. 
Mrs. King reviewed the items claimed as damages thoroughly with 
the jury. The question asked by her counsel, however, regarding 
the award received was calculated to lead to confusion rather 
than clarification. 
3. THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER AND AWARD THOSE 
DAMAGES, IF ANY, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE ASSOCIATED TO THE BARRON 
ACCIDENT. 
The jury was properly instructed to award those damages, if 
any, resulting from the Barron accident. The jury verdict of 
$1,865 was supported by the evidence. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the jury award was influenced by considerations 
of preventing a "double recovery". 
THE PRECLUDED QUESTION ASKED BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL DID NOT DEAL WITH A RESOLUTION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST FEREDAY 
The Court's opinion states that Mrs. King should be able, on 
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redirect examination, to explain what resolution was made of her 
claims against Fereday. The opinion implies that the question 
asked by Mrs. King's counsel would have explained the resolution 
of her claims. 
In fact, the question asked by Mrs. King's counsel was not 
directed towards clarifying the resolution of the claim made 
against Fereday. Plaintiff's Counsel asked: 
Mr. Potter: Sonja, in the other action, was any award made 
for the post '82 expenses? Tr. pg. 126. 
Timely objection was made and sustained by the Court. 
As this Court noted in its decision, the jury in the Fereday 
matter made no award of damages due to a finding that the Fereday 
accident was Mrs. King's fault, 100%. The issue concerning 
whether an award was made was irrelevant because it did not deal 
with the issue before the Barron court; i.e., what damages, if 
any, were attributable to the Barron accident. Had Plaintiff's 
counsel inquired regarding whether the jury in the Fereday matter 
had made a determination as to what injuries were attributable to 
the Fereday accident or what injuries were attributable to the 
Barron accident, perhaps such a question would have been helpful 
to the jury in making its determination. However, no finding at 
all was made concerning damages in the Fereday matter. 
To advise the jury that no award was made in the Fereday matter 
was to invite the jury to speculate that all of the damages 
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claimed by Mrs. King (in both lawsuits) had already been 
determined by a previous jury to be attributable to the Barron 
accident. The Court's ruling that the evidence was irrelevant 
left the jury to rely on the evidence submitted to it for its 
consideration without influence from what the previous jury had 
done. 
Even if Mrs. King had been allowed to testify that she received 
no award in the Fereday matter, would the jury have been better 
informed? An explanation would have been required to show the 
reasons why no award was made. Would the jury then have required 
a summary of all of the evidence put on in the Fereday matter to 
understand why the jury ruled as it did? 
Consider the situation where a jury may have awarded to Mrs. King 
the hundreds of thousands of dollars she sought from Mr. Fereday, 
would such evidence have been relevant in the Barron matter to 
show that Mrs. King was compensated for the 1982 accident as well 
as the 1978 accident? 
The point is, of course, that an award of $150,000, $50,000, 
$5,000 , $5.00 or any other sum, is not evidence of what the jury 
did, or did not do, in the Fereday matter with regard to the 
damages claimed in the Barron matter. 
It is submitted that the proper way to handle these matters is to 
have the jury instructed as it was here i.e., to judge the matter 
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on the evidence before it and determine what damages, if any, 
Mrs. King is entitled based on such evidence. 
The fact isf the award is irrelevant to the Barron jury since 
it does not tend to make the existence of any fact more or less 
probable than it is without the evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 302, defines "relevant evidence" 
as: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Defendant does not object to a thorough discussion concerning 
Plaintiff's injuries, the number of accidents Plaintiff has been 
involved in, the resolution of the claims against other parties, 
whether a determination was made in the prior lawsuit as to the 
damages sustained by Mrs. King, etc. However, the question 
asked concerning an award was not probative of the issues before 
the Barron jury and did not deal with the resolution of the 
claims made in the Feredav matter as to Mrs. King's claim there 
that her injuries were caused by Mr. Fereday. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY OF 
EXPLAINING WHY SHE CLAIMED THE SAME INJURIES 
IN THE FEREDAY AND BARRON LAWSUITS 
Plaintiff, on direct examination, expressed the injuries she 
believed were attributable to the accident with Mr. Barron. She 
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attempted to designate those injuries which were caused by the 
accident and those which she believed were aggravated by the 
accident. On cross-examination, Mrs. King was examined as to the 
fact that she claimedf at the Fereday trial, that those same 
injuries were caused by Mr. Fereday's negligence. She 
acknowledged that she had claimed the same damages from both 
Mr. Fereday and from Mr. Barron and had submitted the whole 
amount to the Fereday jury. (Tr. pg. 112) 
On re-direct examination, was given full opportunity to 
distinguish between those injuries claimed to have been caused by 
Mr. Barron and those claimed from the prior accident. Mrs. King 
was examined as to the list of medical expenses which she had 
submitted to the jury as a recapitulation of the expenses which 
she now attributed to the Barron accident. Even though Mrs. King 
had submitted the same list of medical expenses to the Fereday 
jury (with the addition of the medical expenses incurred before 
the Barron accident) she acknowledged that some of the medical 
specials incurred after the Barron accident were clearly not 
related to the Barron accident. The medical recapitulation had 
encompassed all of the medical expenses incurred after the date 
of the accident. Mrs. King testified that some of her treatment 
was for on-going matters which she had already scheduled before 
the Barron accident and for which she did not seek compensation 
from Barron. For example, she had already had an appointment 
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scheduled with Dr. Gordon prior to being involved in the accident 
with Mr. Barron. Although she thought some of the expenses 
associated with the visit may have been attributable to the 
Barron accident, she acknowledged that some of the expense 
may not have been associated with the Barron accident. Her 
counsel indicated, on the record, that he would: 
"Stipulate that a portion of these expenses would not relate 
to the 1982 collision even thought they were after the 1982 
collision, and that would be more specifically the physical 
therapy charges from Roger Larson that she was seeing before 
the '82 collision occurred." Tr. pg 125. 
Mr. Potter, continuing with his redirect examination, asked Mrs. 
King to distinguish between those expenses attributable to the 
Barron accident and those expenses which were on-going. Mr. 
Potter asked: 
Mr. Potter: Sonja, just to make sure we all have this 
straight, are you asking for any compensation on these 
problems before 1982? 
No. 
Also, on the medical expenses, how much do you feel can be 
attributed to the 1982 collision that's on your summary? 
Mr. Smith: Your Honor, I would object unless there's some 
foundation as to what basis she's using to make that 
calculation. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Thereafter, a discussion was had as to the basis for a 
determination as to what expenses were attributable to the Barron 
accident and what expenses were not. The Court ruled that Mrs. 
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King was fully entitled to tell the jury of the claims that she 
was making at the trial attributable to the 1982 accident which 
specific items represent the aggravation or the new condition 
that was created• However, the Court required her to establish a 
foundation for making the determination. The Court specifically 
allowed Mrs. King to testify as to what she believed was caused 
by the 1982 accident. 
Thereafter, Mr. Potter asked: 
Sonja, in the other action, was any award made for the post 
'82 expenses? 
Timely objection was made and sustained. 
Mrs. King had already indicated which medical expenses she 
believed were related to the accident of 1982 and which expenses 
were not. The question asked concerned the award given by the 
Fereday jury. As mentioned above, having explained the medical 
expenses, having discussed the prior injuries claimed, the amount 
of the award (based on a finding that Mrs. King was at fault in 
causing the Fereday accident) was irrelevant. 
THE JURY AWARD OF $1,865 WAS CLEARLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND DOES NOT 
SHOW THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED BY THE 
DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE FEREDAY TRIAL 
The Court's opinion states: 
Arguably, the jury determined that while Barron was liable, 
Mrs. King's 1978 injuries were not substantially aggravated 
by the Barron accident. On the other hand, the low amount 
of the jury's verdict ($1,865) may have stemmed from a 
belief on the part of the jury that Mrs. King had recovered 
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in the Fereday suit some of the damages sought in the 
instant case, and the jury did not want to award her double 
recovery. We conclude that the erroneous evidentiary ruling 
may have been prejudicial to Mrs. King, and we order a new 
trial on the question of damages only. 
The jury award of $1,865 was supported by the evidence submitted. 
Mrs. King admitted that she did not go see her treating physician 
for two weeks after the accident. Evidence showed that, on her 
first visit to physical therapist Roger Larson days after the 
accident, she was feeling "improved". The parties had stipulated 
that, since the date of the Barron accident, Mrs. King had 
incurred $1,429.00 in expenses (Tr. pg 29). Of that amount, 
$336.00 was for a spa membership at Gloria Marshall Salon. (Tr. 
pg. 25). Plaintiff admitted, and her counsel stipulated, that 
some of the medical expenses incurred after the date of the 
Barron accident, were not attributable to the Barron accident. 
(Tr. pg. 125). She admitted that she had submitted her claim for 
lost wages (including the time after the Barron accident) to the 
Fereday jury for consideration. (Tr. pg. 60). She admitted 
that she had not worked for over two years before the Barron 
trial, had not looked for a job, and had no offers for 
employment. (Tr. pg. 61-52). 
The jury was instructed, as this Court points out (Opinion pg. 9) 
to determine liability for the 1982 accident and to award damages 
flowing therefrom if Barron was found liable. There is no 
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evidence to suggest that the jury did anything other than follow 
the instructions submitted. 
Further, Plaintiff did not seek for an additur or seek to have 
the trial judge modify the jury verdict. The jury was polled and 
each indicated that the verdict reached was his/her own. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and each of them, it is respectfully 
submitted that this Court should reconsider its opinion and 
reverse the decision reached. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1988. M 
\J. A 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of Defendant and 
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this pW~ day of Ajn&—<U 1988, to: 
R. Dale Potter 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
C-274 Cedar Park 
5284 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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